A Diplomatic Documentation

Express News Service

Satinder Kumar Lambah was a distinguished diplomat. As a member of the IFS (Indian Foreign Service), he has held important positions in Pakistan, Hungary, Russia and Germany, and has been conferred with an Order of Merit by Germany. He has been the PM’s Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and has worked for the Non-Aligned Movement and National Security Advisory Board. Plus, towards the end of his career, he was the Chairman of Ananta Aspen Centre.

This is his first and last book. (There was another one on Rabindranath Tagore and Germany, but that was edited, not authored.) Published posthumously––he passed away in June 2002––it has laudatory blurbs by Manmohan Singh, Ajit Doval, Shivshankar Menon, Nirupama Rao, TCA Raghavan and Tarun Das. All of them knew Sati Lambah personally. Sometimes, blurbs are about the individual, rather than the book, and one tends to be kinder if the person is dead. Lambah’s role as a player in shaping India’s foreign policy cannot be denied. As the sub-title suggests, he worked under six prime ministers. But I wonder, would he himself have approve of the manuscript, in the form in which it went to press, or would he have wanted significant revisions?

As things stand, there are extensive quotes from official communiques, resolutions, statements and press conferences. The entire speech delivered by the author (as PM’s Special Envoy) in May 2014 is reproduced. There is a chapter with profiles of Zia-ul-Haq, Nawaz Sharif, Wali Khan, Mir Afzal Khan, Mian Ziauddin, General Habibullah, Aslam Khattak, Kulsoom Saifullah, Shireen Wahab, a Station House Officer from Peshawar, Eqbal Ahmad, Sadequain, Ahmad Faraz, Sirdar Shankar Hyat and Kaiser Monnoo. This chapter reads like notes maintained in a diary by Lambah, and one is not sure how it fits into the theme of the book.

What is the theme of the book, anyway? Is it the future of India-Pakistan relations, as the title and sub-title suggest, or is it about personal reminiscences as a diplomat? If it is the former, the latter can figure only insofar as it relates to the former, not otherwise. Thus, the book gives the impression of being hastily cobbled together, without a great deal of thought. It could also have done with far better editing. 

A lot has been written, and will be written, on India-Pakistan relations. As a player in shaping these ties, the author’s objectives are clear: “Today, we are at a point where the prospects for dialogue, engagement and a broader peace process have never seemed so distant… I have been in public service for close to half a century during which period I was fortunate enough to serve in various capacities and assignments in India and abroad. By a quirk of fate or mere coincidence, more than half of that service had to do with matters relating to Pakistan, either in a direct capacity or otherwise… 

A purposeful engagement directed towards attainment of realistic outcomes appears to be an option with a reasonable chance of success.” That hope runs throughout the book, explaining the title. But this isn’t one-way traffic. As Lambah’s experience with Indian PMs has shown, those hopes have been belied in the past, and there is no particular reason to believe they will be successful in the years to come. Of course, what the future will bring is always uncertain.

From 1971, we have the following: “Siddiq Salik, Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the West Pakistan Army during the 1971 war, with daily access to Lieutenant General Niazi, commander of the Pakistani forces in Dacca, who was present at the surrender of East Pakistan and subsequently accompanied Niazi as a prisoner of war in an Indian Air Force plane to Calcutta, observed on arrival in Dacca in 1970 that ‘the poor of Bengal are poorer than the poorest of West Pakistan’.” Given the state of the two economies today, one should reverse the relative positions of the two countries. 

I have already suggested that this book is not a particularly good read, unless you are inordinately interested in Pakistan. If you are, it is useful documentation. One should remember of course that, as befits a true career diplomat, no salacious details are divulged. The book sticks to the straight and narrow official position. There are a few personal anecdotes though––Indira Gandhi savouring caviar, Dev Kanta Baruah’s rude behaviour and so on. Lest I forget, “I have been told by a key member of the Kargil Committee that the report nowhere blamed Gujral for ending R&AW operations.” By no means is this volume a riveting read. Instead, it is dreary, often written like bureaucratese. The bulk of what has been said is known, except that you have it in one place.
 

<br /> Satinder Kumar Lambah was a distinguished diplomat. As a member of the IFS (Indian Foreign Service), he has held important positions in Pakistan, Hungary, Russia and Germany, and has been conferred with an Order of Merit by Germany. He has been the PM’s Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and has worked for the Non-Aligned Movement and National Security Advisory Board. Plus, towards the end of his career, he was the Chairman of Ananta Aspen Centre.</p> <p>This is his first and last book. (There was another one on Rabindranath Tagore and Germany, but that was edited, not authored.) Published posthumously––he passed away in June 2002––it has laudatory blurbs by Manmohan Singh, Ajit Doval, Shivshankar Menon, Nirupama Rao, TCA Raghavan and Tarun Das. All of them knew Sati Lambah personally. Sometimes, blurbs are about the individual, rather than the book, and one tends to be kinder if the person is dead. Lambah’s role as a player in shaping India’s foreign policy cannot be denied. As the sub-title suggests, he worked under six prime ministers. But I wonder, would he himself have approve of the manuscript, in the form in which it went to press, or would he have wanted significant revisions?</p> <!-- WP QUADS Content Ad Plugin v. 2.0.81 --> <div class="quads-location quads-ad200503 " id="quads-ad200503" style="float:none;margin:0px 3px 3px 3px;padding:0px 0px 0px 0px;" data-lazydelay="0"> <!-- WP QUADS - Quick AdSense Reloaded v.2.0.81 Content AdSense async --> <ins class="adsbygoogle" style="display:block;" data-ad-format="auto" data-ad-client="ca-pub-7550963679842137" data-ad-slot="1823845571"></ins> <script> (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});</script> <!-- end WP QUADS --> </div> <p>As things stand, there are extensive quotes from official communiques, resolutions, statements and press conferences. The entire speech delivered by the author (as PM’s Special Envoy) in May 2014 is reproduced. There is a chapter with profiles of Zia-ul-Haq, Nawaz Sharif, Wali Khan, Mir Afzal Khan, Mian Ziauddin, General Habibullah, Aslam Khattak, Kulsoom Saifullah, Shireen Wahab, a Station House Officer from Peshawar, Eqbal Ahmad, Sadequain, Ahmad Faraz, Sirdar Shankar Hyat and Kaiser Monnoo. This chapter reads like notes maintained in a diary by Lambah, and one is not sure how it fits into the theme of the book.googletag.cmd.push(function() {googletag.display(‘div-gpt-ad-8052921-2’); });</p> <p>What is the theme of the book, anyway? Is it the future of India-Pakistan relations, as the title and sub-title suggest, or is it about personal reminiscences as a diplomat? If it is the former, the latter can figure only insofar as it relates to the former, not otherwise. Thus, the book gives the impression of being hastily cobbled together, without a great deal of thought. It could also have done with far better editing. </p> <p>A lot has been written, and will be written, on India-Pakistan relations. As a player in shaping these ties, the author’s objectives are clear: “Today, we are at a point where the prospects for dialogue, engagement and a broader peace process have never seemed so distant… I have been in public service for close to half a century during which period I was fortunate enough to serve in various capacities and assignments in India and abroad. By a quirk of fate or mere coincidence, more than half of that service had to do with matters relating to Pakistan, either in a direct capacity or otherwise… </p> <!-- WP QUADS Content Ad Plugin v. 2.0.81 --> <div class="quads-location quads-ad200503 " id="quads-ad200503" style="float:none;margin:0px 3px 3px 3px;padding:0px 0px 0px 0px;" data-lazydelay="0"> <!-- WP QUADS - Quick AdSense Reloaded v.2.0.81 Content AdSense async --> <ins class="adsbygoogle" style="display:block;" data-ad-format="auto" data-ad-client="ca-pub-7550963679842137" data-ad-slot="1823845571"></ins> <script> (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});</script> <!-- end WP QUADS --> </div> <p>A purposeful engagement directed towards attainment of realistic outcomes appears to be an option with a reasonable chance of success.” That hope runs throughout the book, explaining the title. But this isn’t one-way traffic. As Lambah’s experience with Indian PMs has shown, those hopes have been belied in the past, and there is no particular reason to believe they will be successful in the years to come. Of course, what the future will bring is always uncertain.</p> <p>From 1971, we have the following: “Siddiq Salik, Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the West Pakistan Army during the 1971 war, with daily access to Lieutenant General Niazi, commander of the Pakistani forces in Dacca, who was present at the surrender of East Pakistan and subsequently accompanied Niazi as a prisoner of war in an Indian Air Force plane to Calcutta, observed on arrival in Dacca in 1970 that ‘the poor of Bengal are poorer than the poorest of West Pakistan’.” Given the state of the two economies today, one should reverse the relative positions of the two countries. </p> <p>I have already suggested that this book is not a particularly good read, unless you are inordinately interested in Pakistan. If you are, it is useful documentation. One should remember of course that, as befits a true career diplomat, no salacious details are divulged. The book sticks to the straight and narrow official position. There are a few personal anecdotes though––Indira Gandhi savouring caviar, Dev Kanta Baruah’s rude behaviour and so on. Lest I forget, “I have been told by a key member of the Kargil Committee that the report nowhere blamed Gujral for ending R&AW operations.” By no means is this volume a riveting read. Instead, it is dreary, often written like bureaucratese. The bulk of what has been said is known, except that you have it in one place.<br />  <br />